Fraud Upon The Court

Friday, September 24, 2010

Marcia Waldron Obstructed Justice On The Record

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

JACQUELYN B. NJAI, Appellee/Appellant, vs.MR. HOMER FLOYD, ET AL, Appellant/Appellees Case No.: 10-1062, RELATED CASE #08-2366DC. Civil No. 07-1506REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Table of Contents……………………………………………………….1Issues…………………………………………………………………….2-3Argument (ALL Appellees)……….………………………………….…3-10Reply Argument To Commonwealth 10-1062 Appellees …………..10-15Conclusion………………………………………………………………..15-16Certification of Service…………………………………………………..17

ISSUES:
The questions before the court are:
1. Did the district court correctly and impartially follow the intent and elements of Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir.1984), in dismissing a complaint for the failure of the plaintiff to file a timely complaint after the final decision of the Human Relations Commission and EEOC, who gave her from 12/2006-12/2008, when she filed 11/07 and for failure to prosecute? (NO)
2. (1) For alleged frivolous prior cases? (NO)
3. Did the District Court re-abuse its discretion after having the previous (4/4/08-(that included (3/3/08, 3/4/08, or 3/5/08 judgments), judgment and order vacated for not following true Poulis Factors? (YES)
4. Did the Court show impartiality towards the Appellant-Plaintiff? (NO)
5. Were fraudulent statements and/or documents *submitted by the Wilkinsburg 10-1062, Anthony Sanchez, Andrews and Price, et al. used to substantiate sanctions of consistent dismissals with prejudice against the Plaintiff? (YES)
6. Do the piecemeal decisions of the District Court contradict the evidence submitted in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants? (YES)
7. Is it Constitutional for a Court to sanction a Plaintiff for past prima facie participation and opposition to violations of Title VII, ADA, Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 retaliation, conspiracy and discrimination? (NO)
8. Did the Court error when it suppressed exculpatory evidence (i.e. especially the August 17, 2009 right to sue letter and envelop directions with the Right To Sue Letter) from the PAHRC/EEOC, that stated the envelope proof of receipt is the start of statutes of limitation, not the letter date? (YES)
9. Is EEOC a state or federal agency? If federal did not the Court error when it dismissed Plaintiff’s FIOA (Federal) requests? (YES)
10. Should an attorney or others tamper with witnesses to win lawsuits? (NO)
11. Is working as legal civil rights advisor, liability insurance LLP Company for only the state, being a defendant, representing teachers and other public employees all at the same time, IMPERMISSIBLE COMMINGLING? (YES)
12. Did Anthony Sanchez, along with some the PPS/Wilkinsburg School District, change the address of Appellant so it could interfere with her forced early retirement check, during this very appeal February 28-March 31, 2010-by accessing her confidential information and then sending in an rerouting form from the district to PSERS in a malicious attempt to interfere with her benefit checks? (YES)
13. Is this the same tactic and conspiracy that Anthony Sanchez’s firm did, with some EEOC agent Mr. Hardiman, when they changed a letter date and address of Appellant and then claimed she failed to timely respond to a right to sue letter dated June, 2008, sent August 17, 2009?
ARGUMENT:
According to this Third Circuit Court, “In exercising our appellate function to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion in dismissing, or refusing to lift a default, we will be guided by the manner in which the trial court balanced the following factors, which have been enumerated in the earlier cases, and whether the record supports its findings: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4); whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.”
Unlike the case footnoted, Plaintiff [N’Jai] had no lawyer that was ill, who constantly did not fulfill his/her responsibilities. Plaintiff even though pro se, did not neglect her responsibilities, and none of her claims were frivolous.
Similarly, as in this appeal by Appellant [N’Jai], she requests the Third Circuit court to please determine whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing all complaints and parties of Plaintiff with prejudice, and in ruling that because she [N’Jai], rightfully participated in protected activities against Anthony Sanchez and his firm Andrews and Price, LLP, et al., in the past, that some how is the District Court’s constitutional basis for its sanctions against the Plaintiff with regards to the above Poulis factors in this case.
The extent of the Appellant/Petitioner’s responsibility is reflected in the docket sheets of this case that is attached to the Appellant’s concise statement. Clearly the Pro Se Appellant, who has no help, forma pauperis status due to very limited resources, who is being challenged by legal liability insurance companies, established law firms and attorneys, and who has never been to law school, has a great responsibility that she has remarkably kept up from 2004-2010 -despite the partialities and pain she faces from being constantly retaliated against and discriminated against by some of the same attorney, state and federal-defendants 1994-2010. It is Appellant’s [N’Jai’s], position that she has overly compensated her (informal-liberally construed), responsibility. Even this Third Circuit Court who vacated a judgment (in related case 08-2366), did not do so based upon frivolous claims. The District Court, and most of the Defendants acknowledge her skill in writing briefs, appendixes, and persevering in meeting her court ordered or legal responsibilities. See January 30, 2009 Proceeding, page 58, lines 16-19.
Although Appellant filed this case in 11/07, from that time until now 3/10, there has been no discovery, until now, no filing of appellees’ briefs, no interrogatories, etc. against the Plaintiff. So the District Court capriciously tried to redundantly order Appellant-Petitioner to file motions and briefs, (11/08-12/09), and report to oral (1/30/10 and 8/21/09) arguments, in order to try and help the Defendants come up with a false perception of the Appellant-Petititoner, that she is prejudicing the Defendants for filing lawsuits against them for violating her civil and constitutional rights, instead of sanctioning and stopping the discrimination, or finding out the truth-or the merits of the case. They ignored this 3rd Circuit Appeal vacation of 4/4/08 order, page 2, although not precedential, this court that stated,
“We review the District Court’s order for abuse of discretion. See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). Wjile we defer to the District Court’s Discretion, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in limited circumstances and doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.”
Appellant finds it abusive for a court, EEOC, Commonwealth 10-1062 Defendants, a liability insurance firm (that was in charge of the Appellant’s liability insurance with both the Pittsburgh Public Schools and Wilkinsburg SD 10-1062 and other Defendants), and attorneys to continuously think she [N’Jai] has to allow someone to deny her tenure and other professional opportunities, her own personal property, liberties, and resources of the State she is forced to pay taxes for and that she went to school for, that she has permanent certification in, that she is entitled to ; and if she exerts her rights against them, then she has to be subjected to unwarranted sanctions, judgments with prejudice, and retaliation against her. The Defendants had a right to Federal and state information that Plaintiff was not allowed. They were allowed to file for extensions of time after they were late, or after they failed to fulfill their responsibilities. So, the prejudice did not come to the Appellees, but clearly the Appellant was prejudiced.
According to the Court, to be ill, suffering from bitter cold, and inconvenienced-yet brave and determined enough to file for a timely extension of time and motion to reconsider using what Appellant thought was “electronic filing,” are not important considerations for that extension and is cruel and unreasonable sanctions. This makes the Appellant wonder if the interference of her motions were deliberate to justify a 1st, or 3rd Poulis factor- dismissal with prejudice to save face of the Court who had its prior judgment and order vacated by a pro se litigant. This is especially true when each of the Commonwealth 10-1062, Wilkinsburg 10-1062, and other defendants stated in their responses that there was NO history of dilatoriness. Why create dilatoriness by the Court’s “hearsay” of some other judge that Plaintiff never had a chance to defend or have due process against? Appellant argues she was no dilatory intention in this case.
Appellant has shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and by the preponderance of the evidence that she was discriminated against, she has a lot of evidence and other people saw and/or wrote about witnessing discrimination against the Appellant in Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendant-School District. The very list of past cases of the Appellant themselves show that the timing, bad faith motives of the Defendants, and opportunities with the District show ongoing retaliation from 1994-2010, despite the pending of the protected activities 1994-2010. Evidence submitted by the Appellant and the PHRC shows discrimination based upon race, disability, age, Sections 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, ADA, IDEA, Whistleblower’s Acts retaliation. Judgments in favor of the Appellant prove the cases could not have been made in bad faith and were not frivolous. Appellant will stop suing the Defendants when they stop discriminating and retaliating against her. As a result, the 4th Poulis factor is also in the Appellant’s favor.
It is clear to even Pro Se Appellant, that the Court was not interested in fair “effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entail[ed] an analysis of alternative sanctions.” Instead the Court continued to belittle, and put down each technical thing Appellant did, and whenever something went to motive in behalf of the Appellant and merits, the Court came up with an order to interfere with that exculpatory evidence-despite that these actions appear bias and unreasonable on the record.
Lastly, in terms of the Poulis factors, the case merits were not fairly considered, because to state that Appellants claims that whites or younger colleagues getting promotional and other opportunities that were denied Appellant are not claims for which relief can be granted. Yet, in case Samuel Howard v. Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, Sam being denied promotional opportunities unlike his white peers was a claim for which relief could be granted. To state that Appellant is crazy in her employer’s administrative offices because she participated in protected activities are claims for which relief can and has been granted hundreds of times. To state that the agents for PAHRC/EEOC conspired with Wilkinsburg School District, by and through Anthony Sanchez is not under the color, or Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 is not a claim for which relief could be granted is not true and is unconstitutional. For Wilkinsburg School District to deprive Appellant of any due process, or equal protections afforded to others is a claim for which relief can be granted. To ignore orders and judgments from courts to return the monetary property of Appellant, is depriving Appellant of her 5th and 14th Amendment rights. Therefore, it is Appellant’s position that her claims including the Section 1981 claims are not valid just because the Defendants denied them, is unconstitutional and unreasonable.
"An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." [Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 (1885)]
“[W]e have held that dismissals based on the apparent default of counsel require the court not just to balance the Poulis factors but also to provide the litigant notice and a hearing. Dunbar v.
Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987). Even where the attorney’s actions are “flagrant,” a litigant’s potentially meritorious claim is not to be dismissed in the absence of evidence that the litigant bears any personal responsibility. Id. Here, the District Court neither considered the Poulis factors nor provided DiFrancesco with the opportunity to respond to thethreat of dismissal. That was an abuse of discretion.”
Because the final judgment in favor of all Appellees relied upon false information from the Appellees, to get out of liability for their actions, and without any proof whatsoever, the orders should be overturned. Here the District Court blamed Plaintiff for not being able to get the EEOC to give her a right to sue letter until 8/17/09, and then when she got the letter, the Court and the Defendants ignored the regulations of the EEOC to rely upon the envelop dated 8/17/09 vs some fabricated date on a letter claimed to be sent to a wrong address. This address was used dispite the fact that the correct PO Box number has been on the record since 1994-2010. A bad address was used dispite the fact that the EEOC sent Appellant other mail to the correct address and Appellant sent EEOC mail with the correct PO Box address. It is also an important new matter that Appellant just found out on 3/31/2010, that the same Defendants (Anthony Sanchez (using his State Board of Education Positions), accessed confidential information of Appellant, changed her address from PO Box that PSERS had since 2007, to a bad address, and caused 2/28/10 and 3/31/10 benefit checks to be cut off due to a bad address. The PSERS acknowledged what happened, told Appellant and attached is an apology letter from that state agency to Appellant to submit to whomever it concerns. Appellant finds it ironic that in the past from 1994-2010 the same fraudulent and illegal patterns of the behaviors keep surfacing, even during protected Title VII, ADA, and other Federal and state protected activities are pending. Appellant called the US Postal Inspector 3/31/10 and was informed that this is a federal offense and is ID Fraud when someone outside of the Appellant or person, uses personal information to change another’s address. Appellant is filing a mail fraud complaint, as well as wants to tack on this retaliation to this appeal.
For the Defendants to retaliate in 2004, for Appellants participation in Whistleblower Act activities in the past 1994-2004, where she reported drugs, cigarette smoking, sexual harassment and other violations of the Public School Code and federal law, are claims for which relief in both civil and criminal aspects can be granted. For the Court to say that Appellant’s requests for FOIA are dismissed with prejudice, due to no federal agency, but granting the Defendants FOIA requests are merit claims for which relief can and has been granted and shows clear abuse and partiality on the part of the court.
Fraudulent statements (Perjury), and evidence to prove fraud on the part of most Defendants, cannot be a legitimate reason for F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); or any other dismissal. In the appendix filed with Appellant’s Brief of the Appellant, docketed and dated 2/23/2010, Exhibits 1-past 25O to (#9 analysis), show fraud, especially on the part of Anthony Sanchez and Andrews and Price Attorneys, as well as prior filed exhibits that show EEOC/PAHRC, Flipping, et al conspired to deprive Appellant of her rights. They then went further and now used a state agency to tamper with Appellant’s state retirement fund that she mentioned on the forma pauperis form in this Appeals Court that included the very same thing.
For Sanchez to get Wilkinsburg to terminate and not promote the Plaintiff, then state to her bosses and Mr. Rabare (a witness), et al. she is crazy; along with fabricating or misrepresenting the EEOC June 2008 letter sent in an August 17, 2009 envelope; along with claiming there was probable cause, then changing it in retaliation; along with filing legal papers with courts and state and federal agencies stating sanctions should be taken against Appellant’s participation and opposition to their discrimination, along with having exparte legal meetings without the Appellant, with judges and hand pick unknown lawyers who claim to represent Appellant without her knowledge or permission; along with years of past and similar misconduct, show "[p]roof that defendant[s] created a scheme to deceive reasonable people [and this] is sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to deceive, [and] a defendant who intends to deceive the ignorant or gullible by preying on their infirmities is no less guilty."
The District Court cut causal connections and threw out important claims, in order to interfere with Appellant’s ability to prove discrimination. She [the Court] then went on to call oral arguments to intimidate and try and build a false paper trail to buttress the Defendants’ position(s). The Court dismissed (with prejudice) Anthony Sanchez (in his personal and professional capacities), and Andrews and Price, prior to dismissing any Commonwealth 10-1062 Defendants; when Appellant was allowed to sue Anthony Sanchez and his firm et al, and was successful in other case(s). The Court erroneously forbade Appellant to mention anything Anthony Sanchez and his firm did even if unlawful, unconstitutional, or malicious.
In the transcript proceedings for January 30, 2009, before the Hon. Judge Barry Fischer, Mr. Smart (the attorney for Wilkinsburg School District), stated: “Your Honor, just as a point of clarification. In the complaint when references are constantly made between either the Wilkinsburg or the city schools and Mr. Sanchez, he is always referred to as the solicitor. Mr. Sanchez was never the solicitor for either of those districts. HE IS ALWAYS SERVING IN THE CAPACITY AS DEFENSE COUNSEL APPOINTED BY THE INSURANCE CARRIER. So, just to clarify that for the record.” See pages 29 (lines 24-250), and page 30 (lines 1-6).
“No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other.” Matthew 6:24

ARGUMENT AGAINST THE COMMONWEALTH 10-1062 APPELLEES BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES:

According to the Commonwealth Court Defendants, they claim the following untruths:

1. Appellant did not appeal the Commonwealth 10-1062 Appellees, because Appellant did not Appeal the May 29, 2009 Order, and that only that Order enables Plaintiff to seek appellate review of prior orders effectively appealable. See the Brief of the Appellees. (P.1) (P. 12) (Denied)
2. That Appellant sued Only in their official capacity, therefore they have immunity from liability. (P. 6)
3. The District Court properly dismissed the claims against them under civil rights statutes, the ADA, Title VII and the Whistleblower Law under R.F.C.P. 12(b)(6).
4. The District court abused its discretion in dismissing the appellant’s claim under Right to Know Act against the State Defendants. (P. 17)
5. Appellant filed “extensive previous litigation against Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants. (P. 5)
6. Claims Plaintiff said PHRC as an entity participated in a conspiracy. (P.6) (P.9)
7. The PHRC did not understand what documents Appellant wanted, however her request for investigative documents were somehow rightfully denied.
8. They claim the State was not Appellants Employer. (P.9)
9. Appellant failed to file an Amended Complaint on 3/4/08, while ignoring she was granted a right to amend and did amend after the 3/4/08 ruling.

The Commonwealth 10-1062 Appellees claim that since Appellant allegedly did not appeal the 5/29/10, order, (despite the fact that Plaintiff was denied a right by order of the court to file an appeal until 12/9/09), that somehow she forfeited her right to appeal in this 10-1062 , appeal irregardless that the appeal has the same related back and stayed claims. According to those Commonwealth 10-1062 Appellees,
“However, the orders dismissing the claims against the State Defendants were entered earlier in the District Court on March 5, 2008 and May 29, 2009 respectively. These orders are not identified in the notice to appeal-only the order December 9, 2009, which pertains exclusively to the Wilkinsburg Defendants. “On December 9, 2009 the district ultimately dismissed the claims brought against the remaining Wilkinsburg Defendants. [This] appeal followed on January 4, 2010. Notably, the notice of appeal only specifies that appellant is appealing the district court’s Order of December 9, 2009. No other orders of court are identified.”
According to Appellant’s 6/15/09 corrected motion for an Expansion of Time and Motion for a Right to Reserve Issues and Defendants Dismissed with Prejudice, and the Order dated 6/16/09 docketed at #83-84, and Memorandum Order filed 7/15/09, that states,
“Plaintiff’s Motion for a Right to Reserve Issues and Defendants Dismissed With Prejudice for Appeal” was denied.” So, the Appellees’ reasoning that Appellee should file an Appeal before the final order of a case, is frivolous and unlawful. It is also Appellant’s position that the 3rd Circuit Court would not allow her a right to sue prior to a final order and the attorneys and appellees should know this. Therefore, the position to deny an appeal of the Commonwealth 10-1062 appellees as a matter of law should be denied. The Commonwealth 10-1062 Appellees claim Appellant did not file an Appeal for Andrews and Price when the court Dismissed with Prejudice Docketed No. 79, 2 and n.5, 14-15 and n22, dispite that fact that the Court stated she could not file prior to this 10-1062, appeal because there was no final order. (P. 12) (P 13)
Plaintiff also included all Orders attached to her Concise Summary of the Case (Third Circuit Court form), that reads,
“Plaintiff attaches all judgments or other actions of the District Court from which this appeal is taken. Appellant appeals all especially 12/9/09.” So for the Appellees to try and come up with not knowing Appellant is appealing them is a bogus denial, impeached by evidence on the record attached to the Notice to Appeal. In the furtherance of the denials, Plaintiff attached a party list and jurisdiction page in her Concise Summary of the Case, (the 2nd page), and it specifically lists as follows:
1. Mr. Homer C. Floyd (Personal and/or Professional Capacities)
2. Stephen A. Glassman ((Personal and/or Professional Capacities)
3. Mr. Robert Flipping (Personal and/or Professional Capacities)
4. Manuel B. Zuniga, Jr. ((Personal and/or Professional Capacities)
5. PA Human Relations Commission, and
6. Harrisburg Human Relations Commission, all who are Commonwealth Defendants in both their professional and personal capacity.

Yet, on page 9 of the Brief of Appellees, “The appellant made it clear that the individual State Defendants were exclusively sued in their official capacities. Docket No. 3 11; Docket No 45, Memorandum Order As to the Commonwealth Defendants, (March 5, 2008).” See also, page 15, “The PHRC as a state agency, and the named state employees of that agency (all of whom have been sued exclusively in their official capacities), cannot be sued in federal court because the Eleventh Amendment is a complete bar to suit under Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 as pleaded in such terms in the court below.”
Appellant incorporated all documents related to this case and those cases used to argue dismissing this case because she participated in or opposed discrimination in terms and conditions of her employment based upon race, age, perceived disability, and the like. As a result the argument in the Commonwealth 10-1062 Appellees is impeached and should be denied as a matter of law and in accordance with the record. Appellant intended and did appeal and sue in both personal and professional capacities, of those Commissioners or representatives that were involved.
Also, another totally incorrect assertions include the Commonwealth 10-1062 Appellees, stating “Appellant filed “extensive previous litigation against Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants”. (P. 5) Plaintiff has NEVER filed any other case against the Wilkinsburg School District, prior to or after this 10-1062 case.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), “a claim is to be dismissed only if it is found to be "frivolous or malicious."3 We review the dismissal of an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) for an abuse of discretion. LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1118 (10th Cir.1991). "Whenever a plaintiff states an arguable claim for relief, dismissal for frivolousness under § 1915(d) is improper, even if the legal basis underlying the claim is incorrect." McKinney v. Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir.1991).4
“The appellant appears before us pro se and accordingly we construe his pleadings liberally.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir.1988)
Instead of the lower court, who received the motions for reconsideration and for an extension of time on April 1-2, 2008, liberally construing the pleadings electronically, the court abused its discretion by keeping the motions, denying even getting them, ruling a default, and claiming Appellant failed to prosecute by dismissing Appellant’s complaint with prejudice on 4/4/08. This 4/4/08 order/Judgments (that clearly included (3/3/ and 3-5/08 Judgments) was vacated. Yet, to this very day the Court and the Defendants claim Plaintiff deliberately failed to fulfill her responsibilities to amend her original complaint, when she did not intentionally refuse or fail to do any such thing. From the day Appellant was given a right to file electronically, up to this very day 3/30/10, Appellant has been blocked from filing any papers electronically and when she tries the papers are not accepted. She can get documents and be charged by PACER, but cannot file anything electronically. Then the Appellees try to make the flaw of the ECF be some bad faith action against the Appellant. She has no more control of the ECF than she has to force the EEOC to given her a timely right to sue letter before 8/17/09.
To make matters worse, the Court confusingly allowed Appellant a right to amend, thus quashing the issue of dismissal with prejudice the original complaint for failure to prosecute and Appellant filed a timely amended complaint. But then coming back with the same moot argument to dismiss with prejudice the amended complaint. The court dismantled her claims, and defendants to interfere with Appellant being able to include claims and parties in her amended complaint, then dismissed with prejudice her amended complaint for not including what she was ordered not to include. This is a bona fide abuse of discretion.
The magistrate recommended, and the district court ordered, the dismissal of the appellant's § 1983 claims because they concluded that "[a]n attorney acting as a public defender in a criminal case does not act under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The magistrate cited Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) and Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497 (10th Cir.1979). While this statement of the law is generally correct, the district court failed to note the more recent Supreme Court case of Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984) in which it was held that public defenders are not immune from liability in actions brought by a criminal defendant against state public defenders who are alleged to have conspired with state officials to deprive the § 1983 plaintiff of federal constitutional rights.
"The standard is even stricter where the state officials involved in the conspiracy are immune from suit." Id. at 512. As we set out in Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir.1980), the plaintiff must demonstrate "the existence of a significant nexus or entanglement between the absolutely immune state official and the private party in relation to the steps taken by each to fulfill the objects of their conspiracy." Public defenders are not immune from liability in actions brought by a criminal defendant against state public defenders who are alleged to have conspired with state officials to deprive the § 1983 plaintiff of federal constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION:
Appellant appeals ALL judgments of the lower court that dismissed all defendants and claims with prejudice, including the March 5, 2008 and the March 29, 2008. Appellant sued in both individual and professional capacities, until the Court itself interfered with her right to do s, by denying her right to reserve or file an appeal prior to the final December 9, 2009 order. Title VII, ADA, or the Whistleblower Act, as well as Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, do not allow retaliation or conspiracy with employers of the Appellant who are also state agents and political subdivisions to discriminate and retaliate, nor to file or fabricate false information. The Appellant has a right to know and acquire the same or any information that was fabricated and used against her to come up with a false probable cause dismissal after she was told the opposite. Why did not the State/Federal agencies give her the same information they gave the Appellees, instead of listening to the Appellees say not to tell her? Appellant never filed any extensive lawsuits against Wilkinsburg, she only filed this case against Wilkinsburg. This shows the extent of false information being used and fabricated by the Appellees. Appellant argues that she sued the PHRC in the commissioners and representatives personal and professional capacities and stated that on the record prior to this appeal. The State PHRC is responsible for the actions of its employees. The Appellees did not specify what documents to be gotten on their FOIA/PHRC requests but they got documents that to this very day (4/1/10), the PHRC never gave the Appellant, and included confidential, negative and false information about the Appellant. So why say the Commonwealth 10-1062 Defendants did not know her request? It should have known that whatever papers filed against a Complainant should be given to the Respondent and visa versa, or how else can it proceed in the investigation? The State was the Appellant’s employer, because the Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, and Wilkinsburg School District, are under the PA Department of Education who oversees the Plaintiff right to work as a public school teacher and certification (i.e. her tenure). They are both subdivisions of the state of PA. Plaintiff not only did not failed to file an amended compliant, but also the Court allowed her to file the amended complaint in 2009. The 4/3/08-4/5/08 Judgments were vacated. Therefore it is Appellant’s position that the issue is moot. The case went from 10/16/2008-12/09/09, and she filed a timely amended complaint.
Appellant incorporates all documents on the record and the two other Reply Briefs regarding arguments against the Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Appellees, Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, Andrew and Price, and Anthony Sanchez, that follows.
Whereas, the Appellant has shown that the Commonwealth 10-1062 (related appeal 08-2366), Appellees-Appellants, have not given this court accurate information, then it is clear that the Brief of the Appellees should be denied and the lower Court final or any order should again be vacated. Plaintiff appeals all orders, reserved her rights to appeal any dismissal of any defendant and claims of the lower court including the Commonwealth.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Appellant, Jacquelyn B. N’Jai, served the attached Reply Brief of the Appellant on the Commonwealth 10-1062 Appellees, by US Postal mail, on April ____, 2010.

Respectfully Submitted:

Jacquelyn B. N’Jai

Marcia Waldron Clerk: Affirms Fraud Upon The Court

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

JACQUELYN B. NJAI, Appellee/Appellant, vs.MR. HOMER FLOYD, ET AL, Appellant/Appellees Case No.: 10-1062, RELATED CASE #08-2366DC. Civil No. 07-1506REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Table of Contents……………………………………………………….1Issues…………………………………………………………………….2-3Argument (ALL Appellees)…………………………………………….3-11Reply Argument To Pittsburgh Board of Public Education…………12-15Conclusion………………………………………………………………..15Certification of Service…………………………………………………..16New Matter………………………………………………………………..16
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ISSUES:
The questions before the court are:
1. Did the district court correctly and impartially follow the intent and elements of Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir.1984), in dismissing a complaint for the failure of the plaintiff to file a timely complaint after the final decision of the Human Relations Commission and EEOC, who gave her from 12/2006-12/2008, when she filed 11/07 and for failure to prosecute? (NO)
2. (1) For alleged frivolous prior cases? (NO)
3. Did the District Court re-abuse its discretion after having the previous (4/4/08-(that included (3/3/08, 3/4/08, or 3/5/08 judgments), judgment and order vacated for not following true Poulis Factors? (YES)
4. Did the Court show impartiality towards the Appellant-Plaintiff? (NO)
5. Were fraudulent statements and/or documents *submitted by the Wilkinsburg 10-1062, Anthony Sanchez, Andrews and Price, et al. used to substantiate sanctions of consistent dismissals with prejudice against the Plaintiff? (YES)
6. Do the piecemeal decisions of the District Court contradict the evidence submitted in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants? (YES)
7. Is it Constitutional for a Court to sanction a Plaintiff for past prima facie participation and opposition to violations of Title VII, ADA, Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 retaliation, conspiracy and discrimination? (NO)
8. Did the Court error when it suppressed exculpatory evidence (i.e. especially the August 17, 2009 right to sue letter and envelop directions with the Right To Sue Letter) from the PAHRC/EEOC, that stated the envelope proof of receipt is the start of statutes of limitation, not the letter date? (YES)
9. Is EEOC a state or federal agency? If federal did not the Court error when it dismissed Plaintiff’s FIOA (Federal) requests? (YES)
10. Should an attorney or others tamper with witnesses to win lawsuits? (NO)
11. Is working as legal civil rights advisor, liability insurance LLP Company for only the state, being a defendant, representing teachers and other public employees all at the same time, IMPERMISSIBLE COMMINGLING? (YES)
12. Did Anthony Sanchez, along with some the PPS/Wilkinsburg School District, change the address of Appellant so it could interfere with her forced early retirement check, during this very appeal February 28-March 31, 2010-by accessing her confidential information and then sending in an rerouting form from the district to PSERS in a malicious attempt to interfere with her benefit checks? (YES)
13. Is this the same tactic and conspiracy that Anthony Sanchez’s firm did, with some EEOC agent Mr. Hardiman, when they changed a letter date and address of Appellant and then claimed she failed to timely respond to a right to sue letter dated June, 2008, sent August 17, 2009?
ARGUMENT:
According to this Third Circuit Court, “In exercising our appellate function to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion in dismissing, or refusing to lift a default, we will be guided by the manner in which the trial court balanced the following factors, which have been enumerated in the earlier cases, and whether the record supports its findings: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4); whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.”
Unlike the case footnoted, Plaintiff [N’Jai] had no lawyer that was ill, who constantly did not fulfill his/her responsibilities. Plaintiff even though pro se, did not neglect her responsibilities, and none of her claims were frivolous.
Similarly, as in this appeal by Appellant [N’Jai], she requests the Third Circuit court to please determine whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing all complaints and parties of Plaintiff with prejudice, and in ruling that because she [N’Jai], rightfully participated in protected activities against Anthony Sanchez and his firm Andrews and Price, LLP, et al., in the past, that some how is the District Court’s constitutional basis for its sanctions against the Plaintiff with regards to the above Poulis factors in this case.
The extent of the Appellant/Petitioner’s responsibility is reflected in the docket sheets of this case that is attached to the Appellant’s concise statement. Clearly the Pro Se Appellant, who has no help, forma pauperis status due to very limited resources, who is being challenged by legal liability insurance companies, established law firms and attorneys, and who has never been to law school, has a great responsibility that she has remarkably kept up from 2004-2010 -despite the partialities and pain she faces from being constantly retaliated against and discriminated against by some of the same attorney, state and federal-defendants 1994-2010. It is Appellant’s [N’Jai’s], position that she has overly compensated her (informal-liberally construed), responsibility. Even this Third Circuit Court who vacated a judgment (in related case 08-2366), did not do so based upon frivolous claims. The District Court, and most of the Defendants acknowledge her skill in writing briefs, appendixes, and persevering in meeting her court ordered or legal responsibilities. See January 30, 2009 Proceeding, page 58, lines 16-19.
Although Appellant filed this case in 11/07, from that time until now 3/10, there has been no discovery, until now, no filing of appellees’ briefs, no interrogatories, etc. against the Plaintiff. So the District Court capriciously tried to redundantly order Appellant-Petitioner to file motions and briefs, (11/08-12/09), and report to oral (1/30/10 and 8/21/09) arguments, in order to try and help the Defendants come up with a false perception of the Appellant-Petititoner, that she is prejudicing the Defendants for filing lawsuits against them for violating her civil and constitutional rights, instead of sanctioning and stopping the discrimination, or finding out the truth-or the merits of the case. They ignored this 3rd Circuit Appeal vacation of 4/4/08 order, page 2, although not precedential, this court that stated,
“We review the District Court’s order for abuse of discretion. See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). Wjile we defer to the District Court’s Discretion, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in limited circumstances and doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.”
Appellant finds it abusive for a court, EEOC, Commonwealth 10-1062 Defendants, a liability insurance firm (that was in charge of the Appellant’s liability insurance with both the Pittsburgh Public Schools and Wilkinsburg SD 10-1062 and other Defendants), and attorneys to continuously think she [N’Jai] has to allow someone to deny her tenure and other professional opportunities, her own personal property, liberties, and resources of the State she is forced to pay taxes for and that she went to school for, that she has permanent certification in, that she is entitled to ; and if she exerts her rights against them, then she has to be subjected to unwarranted sanctions, judgments with prejudice, and retaliation against her. The Defendants had a right to Federal and state information that Plaintiff was not allowed. They were allowed to file for extensions of time after they were late, or after they failed to fulfill their responsibilities. So, the prejudice did not come to the Appellees, but clearly the Appellant was prejudiced.
According to the Court, to be ill, suffering from bitter cold, and inconvenienced-yet brave and determined enough to file for a timely extension of time and motion to reconsider using what Appellant thought was “electronic filing,” are not important considerations for that extension and is cruel and unreasonable sanctions. This makes the Appellant wonder if the interference of her motions were deliberate to justify a 1st, or 3rd Poulis factor- dismissal with prejudice to save face of the Court who had its prior judgment and order vacated by a pro se litigant. This is especially true when each of the Commonwealth 10-1062, Wilkinsburg 10-1062, and other defendants stated in their responses that there was NO history of dilatoriness. Why create dilatoriness by the Court’s “hearsay” of some other judge that Plaintiff never had a chance to defend or have due process against? Appellant argues she was no dilatory intention in this case.
Appellant has shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and by the preponderance of the evidence that she was discriminated against, she has a lot of evidence and other people saw and/or wrote about witnessing discrimination against the Appellant in Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendant-School District. The very list of past cases of the Appellant themselves show that the timing, bad faith motives of the Defendants, and opportunities with the District show ongoing retaliation from 1994-2010, despite the pending of the protected activities 1994-2010. Evidence submitted by the Appellant and the PHRC shows discrimination based upon race, disability, age, Sections 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, ADA, IDEA, Whistleblower’s Acts retaliation. Judgments in favor of the Appellant prove the cases could not have been made in bad faith and were not frivolous. Appellant will stop suing the Defendants when they stop discriminating and retaliating against her. As a result, the 4th Poulis factor is also in the Appellant’s favor.
It is clear to even Pro Se Appellant, that the Court was not interested in fair “effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entail[ed] an analysis of alternative sanctions.” Instead the Court continued to belittle, and put down each technical thing Appellant did, and whenever something went to motive in behalf of the Appellant and merits, the Court came up with an order to interfere with that exculpatory evidence-despite that these actions appear bias and unreasonable on the record.
Lastly, in terms of the Poulis factors, the case merits were not fairly considered, because to state that Appellants claims that whites or younger colleagues getting promotional and other opportunities that were denied Appellant are not claims for which relief can be granted. Yet, in case Samuel Howard v. Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, Sam being denied promotional opportunities unlike his white peers was a claim for which relief could be granted. To state that Appellant is crazy in her employer’s administrative offices because she participated in protected activities are claims for which relief can and has been granted hundreds of times. To state that the agents for PAHRC/EEOC conspired with Wilkinsburg School District, by and through Anthony Sanchez is not under the color, or Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 is not a claim for which relief could be granted is not true and is unconstitutional. For Wilkinsburg School District to deprive Appellant of any due process, or equal protections afforded to others is a claim for which relief can be granted. To ignore orders and judgments from courts to return the monetary property of Appellant, is depriving Appellant of her 5th and 14th Amendment rights. Therefore, it is Appellant’s position that her claims including the Section 1981 claims are not valid just because the Defendants denied them, is unconstitutional and unreasonable.
"An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." [Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 (1885)]
“[W]e have held that dismissals based on the apparent default of counsel require the court not just to balance the Poulis factors but also to provide the litigant notice and a hearing. Dunbar v.
Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987). Even where the attorney’s actions are “flagrant,” a litigant’s potentially meritorious claim is not to be dismissed in the absence of evidence that the litigant bears any personal responsibility. Id. Here, the District Court neither considered the Poulis factors nor provided DiFrancesco with the opportunity to respond to thethreat of dismissal. That was an abuse of discretion.”
Because the final judgment in favor of all Appellees relied upon false information from the Appellees, to get out of liability for their actions, and without any proof whatsoever, the orders should be overturned. Here the District Court blamed Plaintiff for not being able to get the EEOC to give her a right to sue letter until 8/17/09, and then when she got the letter, the Court and the Defendants ignored the regulations of the EEOC to rely upon the envelop dated 8/17/09 vs some fabricated date on a letter claimed to be sent to a wrong address. This address was used dispite the fact that the correct PO Box number has been on the record since 1994-2010. A bad address was used dispite the fact that the EEOC sent Appellant other mail to the correct address and Appellant sent EEOC mail with the correct PO Box address. It is also an important new matter that Appellant just found out on 3/31/2010, that the same Defendants (Anthony Sanchez (using his State Board of Education Positions), accessed confidential information of Appellant, changed her address from PO Box that PSERS had since 2007, to a bad address, and caused 2/28/10 and 3/31/10 benefit checks to be cut off due to a bad address. The PSERS acknowledged what happened, told Appellant and attached is an apology letter from that state agency to Appellant to submit to whomever it concerns. Appellant finds it ironic that in the past from 1994-2010 the same fraudulent and illegal patterns of the behaviors keep surfacing, even during protected Title VII, ADA, and other Federal and state protected activities are pending. Appellant called the US Postal Inspector 3/31/10 and was informed that this is a federal offense and is ID Fraud when someone outside of the Appellant or person, uses personal information to change another’s address. Appellant is filing a mail fraud complaint, as well as wants to tack on this retaliation to this appeal.
For the Defendants to retaliate in 2004, for Appellants participation in Whistleblower Act activities in the past 1994-2004, where she reported drugs, cigarette smoking, sexual harassment and other violations of the Public School Code and federal law, are claims for which relief in both civil and criminal aspects can be granted. For the Court to say that Appellant’s requests for FOIA are dismissed with prejudice, due to no federal agency, but granting the Defendants FOIA requests are merit claims for which relief can and has been granted and shows clear abuse and partiality on the part of the court.
Fraudulent statements (Perjury), and evidence to prove fraud on the part of most Defendants, cannot be a legitimate reason for F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); or any other dismissal. In the appendix filed with Appellant’s Brief of the Appellant, docketed and dated 2/23/2010, Exhibits 1-past 25O to (#9 analysis), show fraud, especially on the part of Anthony Sanchez and Andrews and Price Attorneys, as well as prior filed exhibits that show EEOC/PAHRC, Flipping, et al conspired to deprive Appellant of her rights. They then went further and now used a state agency to tamper with Appellant’s state retirement fund that she mentioned on the forma pauperis form in this Appeals Court that included the very same thing.
For Sanchez to get Wilkinsburg to terminate and not promote the Plaintiff, then state to her bosses and Mr. Rabare (a witness), et al. she is crazy; along with fabricating or misrepresenting the EEOC June 2008 letter sent in an August 17, 2009 envelope; along with claiming there was probable cause, then changing it in retaliation; along with filing legal papers with courts and state and federal agencies stating sanctions should be taken against Appellant’s participation and opposition to their discrimination, along with having exparte legal meetings without the Appellant, with judges and hand pick unknown lawyers who claim to represent Appellant without her knowledge or permission; along with years of past and similar misconduct, show "[p]roof that defendant[s] created a scheme to deceive reasonable people [and this] is sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to deceive, [and] a defendant who intends to deceive the ignorant or gullible by preying on their infirmities is no less guilty."
The District Court cut causal connections and threw out important claims, in order to interfere with Appellant’s ability to prove discrimination. She [the Court] then went on to call oral arguments to intimidate and try and build a false paper trail to buttress the Defendants’ position(s). The Court dismissed (with prejudice) Anthony Sanchez (in his personal and professional capacities), and Andrews and Price, prior to dismissing any Commonwealth 10-1062 Defendants; when Appellant was allowed to sue Anthony Sanchez and his firm et al, and was successful in other case(s). The Court erroneously forbade Appellant to mention anything Anthony Sanchez and his firm did even if unlawful, unconstitutional, or malicious.
In the transcript proceedings for January 30, 2009, before the Hon. Judge Barry Fischer, Mr. Smart (the attorney for Wilkinsburg School District), stated: “Your Honor, just as a point of clarification. In the complaint when references are constantly made between either the Wilkinsburg or the city schools and Mr. Sanchez, he is always referred to as the solicitor. Mr. Sanchez was never the solicitor for either of those districts. HE IS ALWAYS SERVING IN THE CAPACITY AS DEFENSE COUNSEL APPOINTED BY THE INSURANCE CARRIER. So, just to clarify that for the record.” See pages 29 (lines 24-250), and page 30 (lines 1-6).
“No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other.” Matthew 6:24

ISSUES:

According to the Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, the following arguments have been proven to justify an affirmation of the lower court’s punitive dismissals:
1. Appellant failed to notify the ECF staff to help her with the electronic filing done on April 1, 2008, and therefore failed to prosecute.
2. The District Court’s vacated 4/4/08 punitive dismissal(s) were not done due to an abuse of discretion because Appellant was negligent in notifying the Court by 4/3/08, and therefore the dismissal with prejudice on 4/4/08 was warranted.
3. Appellant never appealed the May 29, 2009 order before the 12/9/09 final order, and therefore the appeal is untimely, or she failed to prosecute by not filing an appeal before the final order of the lower court on 12/09/09.
4. Appellant “is a former employee of the Pittsburgh Board where she was employed as a substitute teacher. (Docket No. 3; at 4; Docket No. 59 at 3: Docket No. 62 at 4).” P. 5
5. Appellant did not state a claim for which relief could be granted.
6. Appellant argued that Anthony Sanchez served as counsel for both Wilkinsburg and the Pittsburgh Board of Public Education.

APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT AGAINST OF THE PITSBURGH BOARD
OF PUBLIC EDUCATION:

According to the Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, Appellant failed to notify the ECF staff or seek help with her April 1, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for and Expansion of Time. As a result, the Appellees claim that Appellant, who was sick, cold, and suffering from C/O exposure, who took the time to file timely motions directly to the Judge Nora Barry Fischer, and the Help Desk staff of the ECF, should have her Complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute. This is despite the proof that she did contact them. Please wipe out her social security number from the record.
More importantly, the court did allow the Appellant to amend her complaint after the Third Ciruit Court vacated the 4/3/-4/4/08 judgments. So, the issue of dismissing for failure to prosecute on 4/3/08 was resolved and is moot.
According to the Appellee, Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, the Appellant failed to appeal before the final order of the District Court, dated 12/9/09, because the 12/9/09 order only included Wilkinsburg School District 10-1062 Appellees. Yet, see docket sheet for this case, 07-1506, #90, dated 7/15/09,

“Memorandum Order denying #83 Plaintiff’s Motion for a right to Reserve Issues and the Defendants Dismissed With Prejudice for Appeal; Details more fully stated in said Order. Signed by Judge Nora Barry Fischer on 7/15/09.”

According to that attached Memorandum Order,

“And now , this 15th day of July, 2009, upon consideration of the Plaintiff Jacqueline B. N’Jai’s “Motion for a Right to Reserve Issues and the Defendants Dismssed With Prejudice for Appeal,” filed on June 15, 2009, (Docketed No. 83), in which Plaintiff requests “a rigfht to reserve these defendants and claims that were dismissed after the final disposition of this entire case, after she files her amended complaint” because she “cannot appeal claims that were dismissed because this is not a final memorandum or judgment, (Docketed No. 83-2 at 3), and the Defendants’ Respsonses (Docket Nos. 88, 89, and 90), this Court finds that Plaintiff has presented no grounds upon which this Court can issue a certificate for immediate appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also Nasone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1984)(a district court has discretion to decide whether to certify a case for immediate appeal); Pontius v. Delta Fin. Corp., Civ. A. No. 04-1737, 2007 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 90268, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2007)(same); or enter a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 609 (3d Cir. 1998)(discussing analysis for proper certification pursuant to Rule 54(b)); Roberson v. Pelosi, Civ. A. No. 99-3574, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6647, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2001)(same). Plaintiff retains her opportunity to appeal as provided by the applicable Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See FED.R.APP.P. 1, et seq.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion (Docketed No. [83]) is DENIED.” Signed by Judge Nora Barry Fischer., Pages 1-2, attached to the Appellant’s Concise Summary of the Case document filed 1/4/10. How can the Appellees now argue a frivolous issue that Appellant’s appeal should be
denied because she did not override the above order to deny her a right to appeal the May 29, order? More importantly, in Appellant’s Concise Summary of the Case, she stated,
“PLAINTIFF ATTACHES ALL JUDGMENTS OR OTHER ACTIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT FROM WHICH THIS APPEAL IS TAKEN. APPELLANT APPEALS ALL ESPECIALLY 12/9/09.”
Appellant was NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PITTSBURGH BOARD OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, SHE WAS TENURED PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER WITH A RETIREMENT PLAN, AND ALL THE BENEFITS THE STATE HAD AVAILABLE TO HER. Until she was wrongfully fired by defendants in the cases the Appellees claim were frivolous, before the court resolved them. She never was given a tenure hearing based upon continuous lies or perjury from the same Appellees that she failed to do what she did not fail to do. Proof has continuously been ignored as well. Andrews and Price were involed in her retaliatory dismissal. Now they are constantly claiming that she was a substitute, when she worked from 1990-2001 as a full time teacher for the state. Appellant believes this is another cover up of their misconduct or conspiracy so that this court will not see the causal connections between their retaliation and the protected activities. Appellant lost $63,000.00, all benefits, was only given the option of Early retirement benefits, and refused when she found out she had another option. This is why the Third Circuit Court granted her Bill of Costs, and held by Planary Review with mandate against the Defendants/Appellees, NOT the Appellant, until 1 year later when the Clerk changed the monetary ruling without an appeal by the Appellees. Ironically, the Appellees in this case left out the order of the clerk who signed Justice Stapleton’s name and the original order that signature is clearly not the same for Justice Stapleton. For the Appellees to continue in this appeal, using false information that the Appellant told them and they know is not true, that she was a substitute, goes to motive how the Appellees intend to lie, alter the record, and do any misconduct to win a civil lawsuit.
Stating that a counsel who advises only State agents within the Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, and the Wilkinsburg School District, and that gave false and damaging references to Appellant in public and private, which immediately or ultimately led to her construction discharge and termination, are claims for which relief has been granted in thousands of other civil rights cases. The past employer is liable for the bad references of a previous employee. Their employee damaged her reputation, even though she got a satisfactory teaching rating in Wilkinsburg School District. Stating she is insane without any medical license or release of medical information by a patient, or the Plaintiff is slanderous and libel at best. Instead of reprimanding the employee (Sanchez), the Board and Wilkinsburg joined forces with Sanchez and did the same thing to her (i,e, terminating her without adequate due process).
Also for the Pittsburgh Board of Public Education (by and through Sanchez et al), to deny her benefits, monetary property that was awarded her by the court, a right to her property and even liability insurance in contradiction to the PA Public School Code of 1949, then to lie about it in this court that all her cases were frivolous, are causes of action, despite the denials of the Board.
The above issues with the Board, infers a conspiracy, that it was motivated by racial or class based discriminatory intention to deprive Appellant Jacquelyn B. N’Jai of the equal protection under the federal and state laws; and in the furtherance of the conspiracy Appellant lost her right to teach, get a salary with benefits, practice public school teaching, and tenure. Furthermore, the Boards then sought to steel confidential information about the Appellant Jacquelyn B. N’Jai, and then change her address back to a bad address, like they did in this case 07-1506 with the EEOC. It caused Appellant not to get two PA Retirement checks, 2/28/10 and 3/31/10, during this very 10-1062 pending of a final 3rd cir. decision.
WHEREAS, Appellant has proven by the preponderance of the evidence, and testimony, that she did seek ECF help and notified the help desk, she took the ECF course, April 2009 when it was offered to her, and still is not allowed to file papers only view retrieve and pay for court documents blocked by the ECF. The mere fact that the case was pending from 2007-12/09, indicates the claims could not have been fruitless.
CONCLUSION(S):
N’Jai has showed that she could not appeal until the final 12/09 judgment by order of the court, and she has showed that she was a TENURED employee with the Pittsburgh Board of Education, with Early Retirement benefits that the Board/Attorney interfered with on 2/28/10, and a check for 3/31/10. Jacquelyn N’Jai also showed that her claims had monetary value and therefore could not be frivolous. Since the record holds that to the contrary then this Appellee Pittsburgh Board of Education, the past state employer of the same Appellant, has no basis for requesting that the Third Circuit Court of Appeal dismiss or affirm the lower court rulings. As a matter of law the Appellee Brief should be denied. Apellant Jacquelyn B. N’Jai, wants her $73,000.00 judgments with interest, benefits and the record to reflect the evidence.
NEW MATTER: Appellant request injunction or sanctions for the current 2/28/10-3/31/10 tampering with her address to interfere and retaliate against her by stopping her STATE public employee retirement benefits without any due process, and using postal and other ID fraud. These Retirement benefits came for Plaintiff being tenured with the Board of Public Education. It is the ONLY district who could have done this, by and through Anthony Sanchez who works for Wilkinsburg SD as well.
Respectfully Submitted,

Jacquelyn B. N’Jai

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Appellant, Jacquelyn B. N’Jai, served the attached Reply Brief of the Appellant on the Pittsburgh Board of Public Education, by US Postal mail, on April ____, 2010.

Respectfully Submitted:

Jacquelyn B. N’Jai

Can An Attorney Violate Rules of Professional Conduct and Get Immunity????

Clerk Refuse to Docket N'Jai's Motion For Rehearing and Writ To Void Unsign Judgment

JACQUELYN B. N'JAI,
Appellant
v.

MR. HOMER C. FLOYD; STEPHEN A. GLASSMAN;
RAQUEL OTERODE YIENGST; ROBERT FLIPPING;
MICHAEL HARDIMAN; MANUEL B. ZUNIGA, JR.; WILKINSBURG
SCHOOL DISTRICT; PA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION;
HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION; EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION; PITTSBURGH BOARD OF PUBLIC EDUCATION;
SUE GOODWIN; JOSEPH TINDAL; LYNN BLACK; ROBERT
SCHNEIDER; SHAWN DAVIS; RANDY DAVIS; LAURA MANNELLA;
CYNTHIA FLIGGER; DENIS WARHOLA; STATE 10-1062 DEFENDANTS;
WILKINSBURG 10-1062 DEFENDANTS,

01/08/2010
65 pg, 629.48 KB CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice filed by Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai. (CLW)
01/08/2010 RECORD available on District Court CM/ECF. (CLW)
01/08/2010
1 pg, 50.17 KB TRANSCRIPT PURCHASE ORDER FORM (Part 1), filed. Transcripts already on file in District Court. (CLW)
01/08/2010
21 pg, 469.23 KB CIVIL INFORMATION STATEMENT on behalf of Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai, received. (CLW)
01/08/2010
116 pg, 1.33 MB CONCISE SUMMARY OF THE CASE on behalf of Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai, received. (CLW)
01/08/2010
1 pg, 23.21 KB ORDER (Clerk) It is hereby ORDERED that the eight (8) defendants represented in this case by the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General shall hereinafter be referred to as the "State 10-1062 Defendants" for docketing purposes. It is further ORDERED that the ten (10) defendants represented in this case by the Andrews & Price law firm hereinafter be referred to as the "Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants" for docketing purposes. Counsel is directed to choose these party designations, rather than the individual defendants who are part of the groups , when filing electronically. Counsel for the remaining defendants shall continue to use the parties' individual names for docketing purposes, filed. (CLW)
01/14/2010
4 pg, 160.5 KB BRIEFING NOTICE ISSUED. Brief on behalf of Appellant Jacquelyn B. N'Jai due on or before 02/23/2010. Appendix due on or before 02/23/2010. (CLW)
01/15/2010
2 pg, 57.02 KB ECF FILER: ENTRY OF APPEARANCE from John W. Smart, Esq. on behalf of Appellee(s) Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants, Wilkinsburg School District, Sue Goodwin, Joseph Tindal, Lynn Black, Robert Schneider, Shawn Davis, Randy Davis, Laura Mannella, Cynthia Fligger, Denis Warhola. (JWS)
01/15/2010
3 pg, 76.43 KB ECF FILER: DISCLOSURE STATEMENT on behalf of Appellee Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants, filed. (JWS)
01/15/2010
3 pg, 118.45 KB ECF FILER: ENTRY OF APPEARANCE from Lindsay S. Mork on behalf of Appellee(s) Pittsburgh Board of Public Education. (LSM)
01/15/2010
3 pg, 118.95 KB ECF FILER: DISCLOSURE STATEMENT on behalf of Numerous Parties see Appellee Bd Ed Sch Dist Pgh, filed. (LSM)
01/15/2010
3 pg, 119.7 KB ECF FILER: ENTRY OF APPEARANCE from John G. Shorall on behalf of Appellee(s) Pittsburgh Board of Public Education. (LSM)
01/19/2010
2 pg, 9.34 KB ECF FILER: ENTRY OF APPEARANCE from Kemal Alexander Mericli on behalf of Appellee(s) Floyd, Glassman, Yiengst, Flippin, Hardiman, Zuniga, PA Human Relations Commission and the Human Relations Commission. (KAM)
02/23/2010
2 pg, 58.18 KB ECF FILER: ENTRY OF APPEARANCE from Robert G. Wible, Esq. on behalf of Appellee(s) Wilkinsburg Sch. Dist, Sue Goodwin, Joseph Tindal, Lynn Black, Robert Schneider, Shawn Davis, Randy Davis, Laura Mannella, Cynthia Fligger, Denis Warhola. (RGW)
02/23/2010
142 pg, 4.33 MB PRO SE INFORMAL BRIEF with Attachments on behalf of Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai, filed. Certificate of Service dated 02/20/2010 by US mail. (EMA)
03/05/2010
3 pg, 82.97 KB ECF FILER: Withdraw of Appearance by John G. Shorall on behalf of Appellee Bd Ed Sch Dist Pgh. Certificate of Service dated 03/05/2010. (LSM)
03/22/2010
27 pg, 90.24 KB ECF FILER: ELECTRONIC BRIEF on behalf of Appellee State 10-1062 Defendants, filed. Certificate of Service dated 03/22/2010 by US mail, email, clerk. (KAM)
03/22/2010
41 pg, 1.85 MB ECF FILER: ELECTRONIC BRIEF on behalf of Appellee Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants, filed. Certificate of Service dated 03/22/2010 by US mail. (JWS)
03/22/2010
591 pg, 28.32 MB ECF FILER: ELECTRONIC APPENDIX on behalf of Appellee Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants, filed. Certificate of service dated 03/22/2010 by US mail. (JWS)
03/22/2010
21 pg, 98.69 KB ECF FILER: ELECTRONIC BRIEF on behalf of Appellee Bd Ed Sch Dist Pgh, filed. Certificate of Service dated 03/22/2010 by US mail, email, clerk. (LSM)
03/23/2010
4 pg, 18.33 KB ECF FILER: Motion filed by Appellee Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants to supplement the appendix. Certificate of Service dated 03/23/2010. (JWS)
03/24/2010 HARD COPY RECEIVED from Appellee Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants - Brief. Copies: 10. (RM)
03/24/2010 HARD COPY RECEIVED from Appellee Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants - Supplemental Appendix. Copies: 4. Volumes: 9 (MS)
03/24/2010
1 pg, 19.69 KB ORDER (Clerk) granting Motion by Appellee Wilkinsburg 10-1062 Defendants for Leave to File Supplemental Appendix with filing as of March 22, 2010, filed. (EAF)
03/25/2010 HARD COPY RECEIVED from Appellee State 10-1062 Defendants - Brief. Copies: 10. (RM)
03/26/2010 HARD COPY RECEIVED from Appellee Bd Ed Sch Dist Pgh - Brief. Copies: 10. (RM)
04/05/2010
17 pg, 774.27 KB PRO SE REPLY BRIEF on behalf of Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai in Response to State 10-1062 Defendents , filed. Pages: 16. Certificate of Service dated 04/03/2010 by US mail.--[Edited 04/06/2010 by EAF] (EAF)
04/05/2010
14 pg, 490.42 KB PRO SE SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF on behalf of Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai in Response to Wilkinsburg 10-1062, received. Pages: 12. Manner of Service: mail. Certificate of Service dated 04/03/2010.--[Edited 04/06/2010 by EAF] (EAF)
04/05/2010
17 pg, 689.01 KB PRO SE SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF on behalf of Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai in Response to Bd Ed Sch Dist Pgh, received. Pages: 16. Manner of Service: mail. Certificate of Service dated 04/03/2010. (EAF)
04/07/2010
2 pg, 70.72 KB NON COMPLIANCE Order issued to Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai regarding the reply briefs filed on 04/05/2010. Please open the attachment for the full text of the Order. Compliance due by 04/16/2010. (EAF)
04/12/2010
9 pg, 290.51 KB MOTION with attachments filed by Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai for Leave to File Supplemental Reply Briefs and to Supplement the District Court Record. Response due on 04/19/2010. Certificate of Service dated 04/08/2010. (EAF)
04/12/2010 COMPLIANCE RECEIVED. Received Motion to File Supplemental Reply Briefs from Appellant. (EAF)
05/26/2010
14 pg, 529.6 KB MOTION (with Attachments) filed by Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai for Leave to File Exculpatory Supplemental Attachments. Certificate of Service dated 04/24/2010. [SEND TO MERITS]--[Edited 06/04/2010 by NF] (MS)
06/04/2010
1 pg, 60.6 KB ORDER (Clerk) referring to the merits panel the Motion to file supplemental appendix, with attachments, filed by Appellant Ms. Jacquelyn B. N'Jai. SEND TO MERITS PANEL., filed. (MW)
06/17/2010
1 pg, 77.79 KB CALENDARED for Thursday, 07/01/2010. (PM)
07/01/2010 SUBMITTED (Pro Se - 3rd Cir. LAR 34.1(a)) Date: Thursday, 07/01/2010 Panel: BARRY, AMBRO and COWEN, Circuit Judges. (PM)
07/08/2010
7 pg, 45.42 KB NOT PRECEDENTIAL PER CURIAM OPINION Coram: BARRY, AMBRO and COWEN, Circuit Judges. Total Pages: 7. N'Jai's motioin to file supplemental briefs is granted. (CLW)
07/08/2010
4 pg, 110.9 KB JUDGMENT, ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the District Court entered December 9, 2009, be and the same is herby affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs. All of the above in accordance with the opinion of this Court. (CLW)
07/30/2010
11 pg, 182.08 KB MANDATE ISSUED, filed. (TH)

Writ Of Mandamus Against Marcia Waldron: Clerk Refused to Docket

Jacquelyn B. N'Jai
PO Box 10133
Pittsburgh, PA 15232

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

JACQUELYN B. NJAI, Petitioner, andMR. HOMER FLOYD, ET AL. (10-1061)MR. MANUEL ZUNIGA, JR. ET AL (10-1062) Case No.: MANDAMUS TO VOID THE UNSIGNED JUDGMENT AND OPINION OF MACIA WALDRON, THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT CLERKSame Cases: DC: 07-1506; 3rd Cir. 08-2366, 10-1061, and 10-1062

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR PROHIBITION AND/OR FOR A DECLARATORY RULING

AND NOW COMES, Petitioner, Jacquelyn B. N’Jai, pursuant to Rules 87, 94, and 97 to petition the Court for a Writ of Mandamus to order Marcia Waldron, Clerk of the Third Circuit Court and/or the Panel Committee, to submit an original Judgment and Opinion signed by a Judge, and give Appellant/Petitioner all information that was involved in the decision in this case (08-2366, This 08-2366 was divided into two cases on 2nd Appeal, # 10-1061-10-1062). The clerk acted as a Circuit Judge and Affirmed only the December 9, 2010 order of the Lower District Court and ignored other appealed orders dismissed during the pending of the December 9, 2010 final ruling to dismiss with prejudice. Third Circuit Court vacated and remanded this same (10-1061) case back to the District Court for the identical same abuse of discretion on 10/16/2009. Petitioner requests that the Court of Appeals be ordered to comply with Rule 74.01(a), 74.02, and Administrative Rule 4.09(6) which require that judgments and orders be in writing and signed by a judge. Petitioner petitions this court for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the court of appeals to delegate judicial powers to non-judges, such as clerks and research attorneys, and to prohibit them from signing orders of the court and exercising judicial authority. Petitioner petitions this court for a declaration declaring void the attached two orders, and all other similar orders that are not signed, and/or not signed by a judge, of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit joining cases 08-2366, 10-1061 and 10-1062, appealed from 07-1506. In support of this writ, Petitioner states as follows:

1. On April 1, 2008, Plaintiff-Appellant, N’Jai, filed 2 Motions via Electronic filing.
2. Clerks of PACER/ECF/COURT (Nora Barry Fischer) intercepted those motions, and dismissed prima facie claims based upon false information that Appellant did not meet the 4/3/08 deadline to file an Amended Complaint.
3. On 4/4/08, Nora Barry Fischer dismissed with prejudice all claims of the case.
4. Appellant/Petitioner filed a timely appeal on
5. On 10/16/2008, the Third Circuit Court reversed and vacated a 4/4/08 Judgment by the same Judge Nora Barry Fischer in this appeal.
6. From 11/2008-12/8/09, the lower court and some defendants obstructed justice and court documents to support another dismissal with prejudice.
7. Between 11/2008-12/08/09, Judge Nora Barry Fischer rendered many orders and judgments in case 07-1506.
8. Appellant/Petitioner was ordered not to file an appeal before 12/9/09.
9. Appellant/Petitioner filed motions to reserve right to appeal until final 12/9/09 order/judgment/opinion.
10. Lower Court Judge Nora Barry Fischer, denied the Appellant a right to file prior to 12/9/10 final judgment or to reserve rights on the grounds that she had a right to appeal as a matter of law the final decision 12/9/10.
11. 1/4/10, Appellant/Petitioner filed both an Appeal and a Mandamus. Case 10-1061 was the appeal number, and then it was split into 10-1061 and 10-1062.
12. On 4/4/10, the Mandamus (10-1061) was denied on the grounds that Appellant/Petitioner had a right to Appeal instead, and therefore not Petition was needed. There was no signature on the Opinion.
13. Newly discovered evidence of retaliation during and before the Appeal by Appellees happened 2004-2010.
14. From 1/4/10-7/8/10 the Appeal was pending.
15. From 4/12/10-5/26/10 Marcia Waldron the Court Clerk never posted the motion and damaging evidence against the Appellees until 5/26/10, and then 7/8/10.
16. 7/8/10 Marcia Waldron ordered that exculpatory and damaging documents and motion evidence against the Appellees that were granted.
17. 7/8/10 Marcia Waldron affirmed the lower Court dismissal with prejudice without a judge’s signature or authority to do so.
18. Appellant/Petitioner is filing this Writ of Mandamus to compel the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s Clerk to stop acting as a Judge and for an audit of her cases for obstruction, abuse and fraud upon the court.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that this court will:

1. Order the respondent(s) to comply with established Appellant and Federal procedures.
2. Order the Third Circuit Court to overturn a ruling that basis is dismissal with prejudice proof of retaliation for participation in protected activities as a defense or reason for dismissal with prejudice.
3. Order the Courts to allow redress and sanctions against the Appellees in a court of law for retaliation during the pending of the protected activities.
4. Order Marcia Waldron and any Clerk of court to serve as attorneys for the Appellees.
5. Order the Third Circuit Court and District Court to allow monetary damages for willful retaliation.
6. Prohibit non-judges from exercising judicial authority.
7. Prohibit clerks of court from obstructing justice, court documents, and issues of the Appellants to help buttress the Appellee’s position.
8. Declare void the attached “opinions,” “orders” and “judgments” of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that were not signed or that were written by a court clerk.
9. In its administrative capacity, to audit the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and Federal District Court for the Western District of PA to ensure that the Courts policies and procedures are in compliance with the law and the rules of the Courts.
10. To make any other order necessary to ensure the integrity of the judicial system and ensure the people’s (or taxpayer’s), right to due process of law as required by the US Constitution.
11. To declare the Appellant’s civil and Constitutional right to recover for stolen monetary property, monetary judgments she received from courts that were fraudulently voided by clerks and hand written by Judges who are friends with Appellees in her cases, or others.

Dated this 17th day of July, 2010

PO Box 10133Pittsburgh, PA 15232Jacquelyn B. N'Jai